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region to region. When the Spanish market matures, 
Clarence indicated that Italy was likely to heat up. He 
felt that the UK market would settle over the next year 
and he was unsure if interest would ever fully ignite 
in the Greek market. Once all matters had resolved, 
the cycle would most likely start over again. Johannes 
Bitter-Suermann said he felt that there would be no 
winners, no losers and no blood-bath and Juan Amigó 
Müller said that there would be deals but he did not 
believe there would be a crash in prices and that the 
market would become steadier over time.
Conclusion
In summar y, this was an extremely lively and 
entertaining discussion on a very worthy and relevant 
topic. In particular, the panel spoke openly about the 
finance tools and concepts that had given rise to the 
global financial crisis and the unprecedented amount 
of distressed loans and real estate in the current 
market. By way of reassurance, the panel appeared to 
be of the combined view that although this financial 
crisis has been extremely brutal and prolonged it was 
nonetheless part of a continuing economic cycle. 
Although much of the session revolved around the 
position in relation to European real-estate, the reason 
for that is there is a significant amount of distress 
across Europe at the moment. It was clear from the 
talk that distressed loan and real estate investment 
must be viewed from a global perspective with the 
relevant players moving from market to market as the 
environment changes over time. Whilst at present the 
main investment players are coming in to Europe from 
other continents, when the European markets improve 
no doubt the cycle will reverse. 
There was an overall consensus that little had been 
learnt from the global financial crisis and that similar 
mistakes were being made again already. As a rule 
of thumb it was observed that ‘the corporate brain 
is washed every three years’, which brings to mind a 
suitable (German) quote to conclude upon: 
‘We learn from history that we do not learn from history’ 
(George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel)
Setting the context
To say that any sector has remained unscathed by the 
recent global financial crisis is truly a myth. One sector 
quite familiar with the effects of the recent recession is 
the automotive sector. From as early as mid-2007, the 
purchase of vehicles began to decline sharply from 
15.6m to 12m annually, a decrease of 23 per cent.1 
This reflected the reality that the economic climate 
affected consumer vehicular investments. 
In the South Western European area (Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal), a trilogy of challenges 
arose for car production and sales. First customers, 
who would usually retain their vehicles for no more 
than five years, now decided to retain them for up to 
seven years, resulting in a decline in car purchases of 
eight per cent between 2007 and 2014. Second, many 
of the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)2 
discovered offshore production. Therefore greater 
levels of production was seen in the BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China), with Romania and 
Thailand now developing. Statistics showed that OEMs 
located onshore in Europe (France, Spain and Italy) 
were not growing. This directly affected employment 
in the European automotive industry. Until 2008 
production of light commercial vehicles (passenger cars 
and minivans) was consistent. However, after that date, 
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in line with the financial crisis, there was a continual 
average decline of 42 per cent. This severely affected 
employment and union-related issues reached a peak. 
In most car producing states, production dropped 
from seven days a week to a few days. Even more severe 
were the effects felt by upper mid-sized saloon (or 
sedan) cars, where a decline in consumption by 70 per 
cent reduced the working week to one day. Issues of 
retention of skilled employees often means that highly 
skilled workers were assigned comparatively menial 
tasks such as security. The direct links (and effects) 
between the automotive industry and employment have 
been considered by the International Labour Office in 
2010 Report The Global Economic Crisis: Sectoral Coverage 
– Automotive Industry: Trends and Reflections.3
Third, the boom in car sales pre-2007 resulted in 
the entrance of many new OEMs or suppliers in the 
market. This increased supply met with decreasing 
demand has added to the catastrophic effects felt in 
the automotive industry.
Having set the context in the automotive sector in 
the post-financial crisis period, it is critical to consider 
the deeper trends. It is well established that external 
economic factors resulted in the sector’s decline, 
however, attention is often not paid to the internal 
reasons for the decline of the automotive sector. At 
the heart of the article, a discussion on the internal 
reasons for insolvency in the automotive sector will be 
complemented by a consideration of tools in legislative 
toolboxes critical to the recovery of the automotive 
sector. Special focus will be placed on the legislative 
developments in Spain and Germany, which may serve 
as pioneers for reform in other jurisdictions. This 
conference report will conclude by looking ahead. 
What future challenges face the automotive sector? 
Are any solutions on the horizon?
Current trends in the automotive sector
In tandem with the global financial crisis, there are 
five trends that assist in a clear and comprehensive 
understanding of the true state of the automotive sector. 
The order of discussion should not be interpreted as a 
barometer of their relevance.
Trend 1: Movement of production
One of the trends in the European market is the 
movement of production. In some cases, production 
remained in Europe but has been moved to Central and 
Eastern Europe where production increased by four 
per cent every year (twice as fast as Western Europe). 
However, in a significant number of cases, production 
has been moved off the continent to the Indian, Asian 
and Latin American continents. In the article Challenges 
for the automotive industry in an on demand environment: 
Seven areas of strategic action, a consulting firm suggests 
that states in Latin America (such as Argentina and 
Brazil) are usually an OEM’s least priority approach as 
the markets are very volatile whereas Eastern Europe 
is preferable due to its much higher and sustainable 
growth potential.4 China continues to a viable market 
for the establishment of OEMs; however, given fears 
about the unpredictability of government regulation 
along with the overcapacity evident as a result of 
reduced demand stemming from the global financial 
crisis, OEMs are hesitant about entering this market.
This move to offshore production has been 
prompted by the high production costs associated 
with manufacture in Western Europe. However, 
manufacturers have argued that this move is not simply 
pre-empted by ‘cheaper labour’ and government 
incentives which would ensure continued viability of 
the company as a whole but rather a range of benefits 
accorded to offshore production. These include lower 
taxes, lower operational costs, lower shipping and 
surface transport costs; all of which will lead to price 
stability. This is one of the proposed solutions to return 
stability to the automotive sector as it attempts to ‘heal 
from the wounds’ inflicted in the post-2007 period.
This reality was documented by Forbes recently:
‘The Hungary division of Audi, Volkswagen’s luxury 
brand, manufactures the entire lineup of Volkswagen 
vehicles as well as produces the new compact sedan 
A3 in the Györ plant. The production capacity at 
the Györ plant rose to 125,000 units, from less than 
35,000 units manufactured in 2012. In addition, 
Skoda, which saw sales rise 26.2 per cent in the major 
Central European markets in May, is also expanding 
its plant in Kvasiny, Czech Republic, to produce a large 
new sports utility vehicle. The successor model to the 
Volkswagen Transporter and Crafter will be produced 
in Poland, after the collaboration between Mercedes 
and Volkswagen for manufacturing these commercial 
vehicle models ends in 2016. For this purpose, a plant 
will be built at Wrzesnia, Poland, providing 2,300 jobs.
‘On the other hand, Daimler is also looking to 
outsource production activities from Germany to 
countries with lower labor costs. The company 
expanded its production activities in central and 
eastern Europe in 2012, with production of compact 
luxury cars Mercedes B-Class and CLA-Class at the 
Hungary plant which employs 3,000 workers. Daimler’s 
Mercedes has only four production locations outside 
Europe and 11 locations within Europe, with Germany 
being the major manufacturing site. While overall 
vehicle production in Germany rose by only 1.2 per cent, 
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production in Romania and Hungary combined 
grew by 14 per cent in 2013. However, Germany still 
manufactures almost five times the number of vehicles 
produced in Romania, Hungary and Poland combined. 
Higher production in low-cost central and eastern 
European countries could boost profitability for the 
automaker. Mercedes’ operating margin stood at 
7 per cent in the first quarter of 2014, trailing Audi’s 
10 per cent. In addition to expanding production in 
China and Brazil, shifting operations to central and 
eastern European countries with lower wages might 
increase profits for Mercedes, going forward.’ 5
Unfortunately, companies have lived to tell the sad tale 
that the oft forgotten flip side of offshore production 
is a possible reduction in product quality. Given the 
resources expended, employees in Western Europe are 
said to have a superior knowledge in the maintenance 
of quality standards. However, offshore production 
does not equate to ‘death’ for quality assurance. Rather 
companies must continually invest resources in new 
production areas through training and, where necessary, 
relocate high-quality employees offshore. 
Trend 2: Extreme competition
In the pre-2008 period, the automotive sector was 
flooded with OEMs. However, the fall in demand in the 
post-2008 period meant that many of these OEMs were 
forced out of the market. Whether an OEM withstood 
the competition created by increased suppliers with 
reduced demand was dependent on two factors. First, 
the jurisdiction in which the OEM was located. This is 
further discussed below where consideration is made 
of the exorbitant spikes in interest rates in specific 
jurisdictions. Second, the success was often dependent 
on the specialisation of the OEM; in some cases, those 
who were too highly specialised were forced out of the 
market due to reduced demand for high-end products.
Trend 3: Rising interest rates
Given the prevailing economic climate, financial 
institutions have proceeded with much caution before 
releasing any form of funding. Further, the frequency 
of announcements on bankruptcy and distress in the 
US automotive market did nothing to restore loss 
confidence in the viability of this sector. Slowing growth 
in Europe in this sector exacerbated this state of affairs. 
All of these factors led banks to the unmistakable 
conclusion that lending to this sector was highly risky. 
This resulted in spikes in interest rates, creating high 
rates of default across companies, OEMs and suppliers. 
For small and medium enterprises (SMEs), the 
increase in the cost of capital over the crisis period 
was highly significant. In Portugal alone, interest rates 
spiked 47–50 per cent. Quite obviously, in the face of 
declining revenues this increase would be difficult to 
absorb and would often lead to collapse. Given the 
interrelationships between companies, suppliers and 
OEMs (among others) and the high reliance on debt, 
this collapse would create ripple effects across the 
sector, as companies would be inhibited from serving 
their debt. The extent of interest rate spikes was often 
jurisdiction-dependent: in Italy, the average spike was 
about 30 per cent while in Spain an average spike of 
20 per cent was recorded. 
The major implication of this spike is that it 
continued to threaten the stability of that sector. In the 
absence of the spike, companies were already unable to 
effectively service their debts due to declining revenues. 
Thus, in the face of spikes, businesses were unable 
to grow. With no business growth, there could be no 
resulting economic recovery. In recent times, cries 
have been made to implement legislation to address 
this unsatisfactory state of affairs.
Trend 4: Car sharing
One of the trends affecting the sale of new passenger 
cars is the advent of car sharing. In the past, car sharing 
was synonymous with car-pooling where an existing 
car owner would offer a ride to individuals who travel 
on the same route. However, this phenomenon is 
fast developing where companies such as BMW have 
teamed up with other agencies to offer a service where 
the user is not the owner of the car and does not bear 
the financial burden associated with a car purchase. 
Services such as Car2Go (sponsored by Daimler 
in collaboration with Europcar) and DriveNow6 
(sponsored by BMW in connection with Sixt) have 
been transforming how individuals use vehicles, 
where customers pay per minute of use and leave the 
car in any legal parking space when they are finished. 
This increased flexibility (in particular, absence of a 
requirement to return the car to a specific location) 
means that customers are not required to plan their 
journey with an established destination (the agreed 
location in which car must be returned). 
Trend 5: Alternative means of transport
With the cost of new cars beyond the reach of many 
customers, there has been an increase in the sale of 
other forms of transport. Of particular interest is the 
bicycle. Data compiled by NPR shows that in 2013, 
bicycle sales exceeded car sales in 23 European states 
for the first time in Europe’s history, with the exceptions 
of Luxembourg and Belgium.7 Apart from the added 
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convenience afforded by bicycles and initiatives to 
promote cycling as a healthy and environmentally 
better option, other factors may be drawing European 
households away from cars. It appears that when 
compared to a bicycle, the cost of a car is prohibitive.
Country Bicycles sold (‘000) Passenger cars 
(‘000)
States with larger demand
Germany 3,966 3,083
Britain 3,600 2,045
France 2,835 1,899
Italy 1,606 1,402
Spain 780 7,00
States with smaller demand
Romania 380 72
Greece 320 58
Slovenia 250 50
Hungary 232 53
Lithuania 115 12
Table: Comparison of European new passenger car and 
bicycle sales (2012)8
Down the slippery slope: main internal reasons 
for insolvency in the automotive industry
There are a plethora of reasons for failure of corporate 
entities in the post-financial crisis period; many of 
which relate to the changing economic climate. These 
may be properly regarded as external factors. However, 
this section discusses the main internal reasons for 
insolvency in the automotive industry. 
First, there was a loss of customer confidence due 
to outsourcing. Many of the companies outsourced to 
China where wages were up to 30 per cent cheaper. 
However, this comparable saving often resulted 
in a loss of quality which rippled into a loss of 
customer confidence, who would, in turn, blacklist the 
companies. This resulted in loss of revenue. Second, 
due to previous pressure from companies, many of the 
OEMs produced on a large scale. However, they were 
unable to scale their production to reflect the reducing 
demand due to the economic crisis. Third, as discussed 
above, the bank’s financial condition in the post-crisis 
period led to a hardening in the allocation of finance 
and spikes in interest rates. 
Fourth, there was a high potential for leakage 
of intellectual property. Given that the OEMs had 
extensive knowledge on the production of the 
particular brand of vehicle, the leaking of any sensitive 
information may have contributed to the demise or 
reduced profitability of the company. The company may 
have been required to pay exorbitant costs to secure 
this information. Fifth, extensive power was held by raw 
material suppliers. Though OEMs played a dominant 
role in the automotive sector in many European 
countries, the supplier often held the controlling 
power as it determined the decisive issue of ownership 
of tools. Where the supplier was large, it often held a 
strong veto in the out-of-court restructuring. Delays in 
this regard contribute to the demise of a company in a 
fragile financial position. To buffer against this reality, 
companies often engaged more than one supplier; as 
a lack of concentration in the supply chain meant that 
the supplier does not have as much power over the 
company. This reality has blossomed into the current 
practice where the company owns the tools and lends 
them to the OEMs. Thus, going forward, the recovery 
of tools should no longer pose difficulties.
The final two considerations are the most intensifying 
points going forward relative to internal reasons 
for insolvency. First, it is well established that highly 
skilled employees are often regarded as crucial to 
the rise or fall of a company and thus, in insolvency, 
efforts are often made to transfer the services of the 
employees. (Issues will often arise where employees 
are often retained on less favourable terms.) Given 
the high specialisation required, whether at supplier 
or OEM level, the skill in producing and assembling 
the parts is integral to the production of high quality 
vehicles. When production was moved east, many of 
these already well-trained and educated employees who 
assisted in ensuring standard-compliance were lost. It is 
well accepted that the access to high-quality employees 
may not pose an issue where production plants are 
located in the United States or Western Germany (due 
to prior investments in training). However, the desire 
to cut cost to provide a more affordable vehicle means 
that this is slowly proving to be a problem in Russia, 
China and Korea. The issue of training and treatment 
of employees will remain topical until many of these 
issues have worked themselves out in practice. 
The second topical issue relates to the challenges 
posed by in-court and out-of-court restructuring 
(due to antiquated legislation or legislation which is 
not sector-specific or sector-adaptable). One of the 
inefficiencies relative to the automotive sector which is 
often highlighted relates to time. In Spain, a minimum 
of two to three weeks elapses before the declaration 
of insolvency and the subsequent appointment of 
the insolvency administrator are made. Though this 
may be negligible in some sectors, in the automotive 
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sector, challenges will arise where this extensive delay 
will facilitate the disappearance of tool as ransom 
for pending payment. By the end of one week, all of 
the assets may have already been stolen, leaving the 
business as no more than a shell. 
Legislative toolboxes for turnarounds:  
key developments aiding the automotive sector
Knowledge of developments in the legal framework 
across Europe are critical for both debtors and 
creditors, particularly where such creditors may be 
situated outside of the jurisdiction. Within the last two 
years, the legislation in a number of jurisdictions has 
shifted its focus to rescuing of the company or business, 
rather than outright liquidation. Focus will be placed 
on two jurisdictions that have recently enacted key 
reforms: Germany and Spain.
Germany
On 1 March 2012, the Bundestag enacted a range of 
reforms to German insolvency laws known as Gesetz 
zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen 
(ESUG). Under the old law, the insolvency judge 
appointed a provisional insolvency administrator 
(IA). From this point, unemployment insurance 
covered wages for the next three months. During these 
three months, the insolvency administrator would 
recommend to the court whether he believed that the 
case should be opened. If so, he usually presented the 
name of a willing buyer to the court and the case would 
end with a sale of the assets similar to section 363 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The insolvency administrator is 
paid a percentage out of the estate based on his return 
to creditors. There were four effects of the old law:
• There were hardly any debtor in possession (DIP) cases; 
• There were hardly any reorganisations;
• The procedures under the law were efficient at saving 
business but ineffective in saving company; and
• Due to the inefficiencies created under the regulatory 
framework, many of these cases were moved to the 
United Kingdom.
Under the new law, on the satisfaction of certain 
financial and employment criteria, the court must 
appoint a creditors’ committee. Then, this committee 
would propose a candidate for the position of 
insolvency administrator. Thus, under the new law, 
the court appoints an insolvency practitioner on 
recommendation from the stakeholders unless the 
court is given just cause as to why that person should not 
be permitted to act in this capacity. During this period, 
the company is given a three month protected screen 
where the debtor company and the creditors work out 
a solution. Given the frequency of DIP under the new 
law, the court also appoints a trustee whose role is quite 
limited in contrast to the insolvency administrator. 
There are four developments:
• Reorganisation (whether by sale of assets but also of 
legal entity) has been promoted;
• There is an increase in the influence of the creditors 
(via the creditors committee which proposes the 
insolvency administrator);
• There has been a drastic increase in DIP cases for 
the reform expressly permits the debtor to stay in 
charge. It should be noted that this was theoretically 
possible under the old law but was never applied in 
practice. The difficulty, which arose in Germany, 
related to a skewed understanding of the DIP 
concept. What was believed was that DIP meant that 
the same management team that led the company to 
its demise would be permitted to remain in control. 
Rather, a proper understanding would lead to the 
fact that stakeholders should agree on who should be 
appointed as restructuring offers and carry out this 
restructuring with the new team. Here, the debtor, 
through the will of the stakeholders, is in control.
• The insolvency plan may now include debt-to-
equity swaps. These changes, particularly where 
the stakeholders have a say in the appointment of 
the insolvency administrator, are fundamental and 
for the benefit of restructuring entities. However, 
German courts are reluctant to administer the 
new law given their compulsion to appoint on the 
recommendation of stakeholders, which has now 
fettered their discretion.
It is clear that this reform will inure to the benefit of 
restructuring in the automotive sector. However, given 
the fact that the reform is less than five years old, it is 
too early to give a final assessment. What is clear is that 
the influence of the customer is very large and that it 
is the customer and not the OEM, IA or court which 
makes the decisions. Despite the fact that it is too early 
to assess, the court’s treatment of future insolvency 
cases in the automotive sector is guaranteed to add 
fuel to an already live debate.
Spain
On 7 March 2014, the Spanish Council of Ministers 
reformed Spanish Insolvency Act 22/2003 to facilitate 
greater corporate debt restructuring by approving 
Royal Decree Law 4/2014. Under this new framework, 
the debtor has an initial two months to contact 
creditors and determine a composition agreement. 
When a petition for insolvency is made, the courts will 
often take two to three weeks to grant a declaration of 
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insolvency. When this is filed, the law permits the debtor 
to continue to run the business as it is believed that 
he is the best person as his knowledge of the business 
is superior; however, an insolvency administrator is 
usually appointed to serve in an oversight capacity. 
Such an individual serves a number of roles which 
include supervising the running of the business 
by the debtor, preparing a preliminar y report 
(eg, classifying claims and creating inventory of 
assets) and reviewing actions during what is called 
the ‘suspicious period’ (also called ‘clawbacks’ or 
‘reviewable transactions’ in other jurisdictions). 
Where the company’s rescue is unsuccessful, 
he must classify the insolvency as negligent or 
fraudulent. This classification raises the possibility 
of liability for directors and other stakeholders. 
One of the latest reforms was the provision of an 
automatic stay. This protection from compulsory 
and enforcement proceeding is a critical tool where 
rescue is a desired goal.
Under the legislation, there are three solutions 
provided for a troubled company:
• liquidation;
• composition agreement (continuity of the business); 
and
• sale of the business unit.
Under the composition agreement, there is a possibility 
of a haircut of up to 50 per cent; however, in practice, 
creditors usually take a haircut of up to 65 per cent. One 
of the most important features of this agreement is that 
a creditor or creditors holding 50 per cent of original 
claims acquire the legal majority to make decisions. 
As it relates to the sale of the business unit, it should 
be noted that 93 per cent of insolvency proceedings 
usually end in liquidation. Within the last few years, 
the trend is to keep the business alive but to close 
the company by the sale of the business unit. This is 
preferable as the new owner does not have to take all 
or any of the assets or any of the employees and no 
liabilities are transferred including taxes; thus, the 
acquisition provides assets that are free of charge. The 
possibility of securing such assets is inviting to banks. 
However, one of the key problems that have arisen 
where the transfer occurs relates to the interim period 
as questions relating to the liabilities arising in the 
interim period often arise.
As it relates to the impact of Spanish insolvency on 
the automotive sector, two key elements are noteworthy. 
First, what happens when the insolvent supplier cannot 
afford to purchase the raw materials that are necessary 
for the manufacturing process? The present solution is 
the acquisition of raw materials by the company. Thus, 
if supplier became insolvent, the rights to the materials 
would remain vested in the company. The second issue 
that often arose related to the retention of tools which 
are specialised for production by the company. Quite 
importantly, there is a provision in Spanish law that 
permits the court (on an application) to separate the 
assets from the company. In such cases, the court must 
be compelled that there is no right to use or retention 
of assets. Outside of the law, the company would simply 
justify ownership of the tools through negotiation. The 
problem arising was opposition in the delivery of the 
tools back to the owner. In practice, it has been found 
that this is best achieved by out-of-court negotiation 
as employees are often prone to hide or damage tools 
where they feel that they have been mistreated.
Going forward, in light of the reforms, there are three 
key unanswered questions. First, what can an automotive 
company do when its suppliers cannot buy the raw 
materials required in the automotive sector? (Possible 
solutions have been devised as discussed above; however, 
the law has not yet addressed directly this area of concern.) 
Second, how can a customer preserve the industrial 
process and prevent stoppage given the implications for 
other suppliers? Third, what can a customer do to receive 
moulds in the company without challenge?
Looking ahead: future challenges facing the 
automotive sector
Looking ahead, there are four major challenges which 
must be faced and countered to reduce the inefficiencies 
and increase the possibilities of a successful turnaround 
in the automotive sector. First, this sector must agitate 
for industry-specific legislation. Given the peculiarities 
within their sector, they must be able to present a range 
of options in their toolbox for legislative consideration 
as some solutions have been shown to be more efficient 
and favourable to certain sectors. In the interim, lawyers 
operating in this industry must carefully consider how 
inefficiencies in the out-of-court produced may be 
reduced (and possibly eliminated). 
Second, as proven above, companies must accept 
(and adapt) to the changes in consumer behaviour. 
Given the shift from cars as the preferred mode of 
transport (due to financial burden, parking and 
congestion issues in large cities), car companies must 
adopt ingenious methods by which the customer’s 
use their vehicles on convenient terms. Reference 
may be made to BMW and Daimler. Contingent 
on this point is the shift in generational trends; 
where the present generation is more interested in 
connectivity and evolving gadgets. This should not be 
seen as a hurdle but rather as an emerging customer-
base who may be willing to invest where connectivity 
meets auto-manufacturing. 
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Third, companies must be willing to invest in newer 
forms of automotive technology such as electric 
or solar-powered cars. Where funding to finance 
such research is not forthcoming from a traditional 
lending institution, companies must access other 
sources of finance. Fourth, companies must accept 
that the inevitable result of the present overcapacity is 
consolidation in the automotive industry. In order to 
scale down production but remain viable, many smaller 
companies will have to sacrifice their individual identity 
through mergers. On the other hand, larger companies 
must now become specialists in their products and place 
greater focus on customer understanding and intimacy.
Indeed, the future may look uncertain for the 
automotive industry (whether at the supplier, OEM or 
company level) but the tenacity shown by many players 
in the automotive sector to continually adapt (both to 
changing customer needs and the economic climate) 
is credible evidence that their car is not out of gas! 
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